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negligence is presumed, while an inference of negligence is an infer-
ence that is drawn by the jury from the facts. Res ipsa loquitur is a
question of law. The cases are collected in 20 R. C. L. 157.
In conclusion we would say that Kentucky follows the general
rule, that negligence may be inferred from proven facts, and the evi-
dence need not be such as would tend to exclude any other cause, but
only such as would permit a reasonable inference to be drawn.
EDWARD DuvAL.
CnIxEs-PREsonipTIo DoEs NOT RUN AGAINST THE PunLIc.-A pre-
scriptive right to maintain a public nuisance does not exist. Ashbrook
v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 139 (1866), Eraver v. Smith, 164
Ky. 674, 177 S. W 286 (1915), Joyce's Law on Nuisances, See. 50. This
general, and long existing rule of law, was laid down as early as
1699. Anonymous, 12 Mod. 342. In this case, the defendant was in-
dicted for keeping gunpowder in a house in town. Holt, C. J., in de-
ciding that case, did so on four points: (1) Evidence--"to support this
indictment there must be apparent danger, or mischief already done;"
(2) Time--"though it had been done for fifty or sixty years, yet if it
be a nuisance, time will not make it lawful;" (3) Place---"if at the
time of setting up this house in which the gunpowder was kept there
had been no houses near enough to be prejudiced by it, but some were
built since, it would be at the peril of the builder;" (4) Benefit-
"though gunpowder be a necessary thing, and for defense of the king-
dom, yet if it be kept in such a place as it is dangerous to the inhabi-
tants, it will be a nuisance."
Although place is indeed a vital element in deciding whether a
thing may, or does, constitute a nuisance, the untenable position that
one might build a house in the wilderness and continue to keep a
dangerous substance in it to the peril of the public, who later build
around the house, was soon destroyed. Commonwealth v. Upton, 6 Gray
(Mass.) 473 (1856), Ashbrook v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky (1 Bush) 139
(1866), Sexton v. Youngkau, 202 Ky. 256, 259 S. W 335 (1924). The
basis for these decisions is, of course, public policy. As the court said in,
the second of the foregoing cases, "A contumacious holder of real estate
cannot retard the public of a city, by refusing to let a street car run
through his land; nor can he, by a noxious trade or pursuit, deprive
the public of its use after its appropriation."
How, then, do so many courts find a way of sanctioning the con-
tinuance of public nuisances? What is there that so often makes a
mockery of this strong, unhesitant, unequivocal language?
It is in the first of Mr. Chief Justice Holt's four points that the
courts find the necessary loophole. It appears a very narrow loophole.
Used rightly, it would no doubt prove an elastic, useful tool, whereby
the ends of justice might be more nearly served. But, also, it is an
opening through which a number of judges have unconcernedly driven
a team of horses. Thus, in Richmond v. House, 177 Ky. 814, 198 S. W
218, (1917), a stockyard was held not to be a nuisance per se although
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located within a partial residential district and but twenty feet from
a church. In contrast to this decision, see Colton v. South Dakota
Cent. Land Co., 25 S. D. 309, 126 N. W 507 (1910), wherein it was
held that a stockyard in a residential district may constitute a
nuisance irrespective of the condition in which it is kept.
The importance which attaches to the element of evidence in. the
decisions on nuisance cases is nowhere better emphasized than in the
case of Commonwealth v. Miller, 21 Atl. 139 (1891). In that case the
defendant was charged with maintaining a public nuisance by operat-
ing an oil refinery in a city. It was alleged that from the refinery
emanated noxious and offensive vapours and that in the refinery were
stored inflammable, explosive and dangerous oils. The defendants
denied that the refinery was a common nuisance and pleaded the capital
invested, the length of time in operation, and the influence of the busi-
ness upon the prosperity and growth of the community. Adhering to
the fourth principle laid down by Holt, C. J., the lower court de-
cided against the defendants, holding. "It is no defense to an indict-
ment for a common nuisance that the business complained of has
been in operation many years. Neither is it a defense in any
measure that the business is a useful one."
The upper court reversed this decision, saying: "If it had been
an admitted or an established fact that the business of the defendant's
was a common nuisance, these instructions would have been appro-
priate, but the question before the jury was whether the business was
a nuisance. People who live in great cities that are sustained
by manufacturing enterprises must necessarily be subject to many
annoyances and positive discomforts by reason of noise, dust, smoke
and odors, more or less disagreeable, produced by and resulting from
the business that supports the city."
To put the question a bit baldly, "When is a nuisance not a
nuisance?" According to this case, "the right to pure air is, in one
sense, an absolute one, for all persons have the right to life and health,
and such a contamination of the air as is injurious to health cannot be
justified; but In another sense it is relative, and depends upon one's
surroundings."
But are the varied interpretations of what constitutes evidence
of a public nuisance the sole and only reason why the right to main-
tain a nuisance is often sustained?
An eminent authority on crimes lays down the rule that long
acquiescence by the public in conditions may prevent or bar an indict-
ment for nuisance based upon such conditions. Clark and Marshall,
Sec. 456c. If this statement is true, then this is an exception to the
general rule that prescription does not run against the public, and not,
as in the element of evidence, merely a means of escape through the
rule itself. American authorities do not sustain this proposition. 1
Russel on Crimes, Sec. 330; Joyce's Law on Nuisances, Sec. 50; State
v. Franklin Falls, 49 N. H. 240 (1870), Ashbrook v. Commonwealth,
64 Ky (1 Bush) 139 (1866). Clark and Marshall cite only the English
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case of Rex v. Neville, Peake, 93, per Lord Kenyon, as authority for
their statement. However, long acquiescence might well be considered
as evidence tending to show that a certain thing, or condition, does
not constitute a nuisance.
Clark and Marshall make the further statement that whether an
indictment will lie where the thing complained of was not a nuisance
when first erected, but became so afterwards, is not clearly settled.
Clark and Marshall, Sec. 457e. This was the third principle laid down
by Holt, C. J., and as has been shown previously, is clearly not in
question today. Commonwealth v. Upton, 6 Gray (Mass.) 473 (1856),
Sexton v. Younglcau, 202 Ky. 256, 259 S. W. 335 (1924). Were this
proposition true, it, likewise, would constitute an exception to the
rule that prescription does not run against the public. With this
exception, however, the fundamental points laid down by Chief Justice
Holt in the Anonymous case of 1699 (12 Mod. 342) are still followed
today.
It may now be pertinent to inquire what we mean by "the public."
In the case of Jones, v. City of Chanute, 63 Kan. 243, 65 Pac. 243
(1901), we discover the following definition: "By the words, 'the
public,' used with respect to the collective body in whose behalf a prose-
cution to abate a common nuisance must be brought, is meant all
those who are affected by the nuisance in the same way, or who,
having occasion to come into contact with it, may be affected in the
same way, though differing to the extent or degree to which they may
be injured."
Thus, where a city is injured in a particular, or special way, as
the proprietor of property, it is not deemed an injury to "the public."
Scarborough, 12 Ky. Law Journal 69; Metropolitan Bailroad Co. v.
Distrzct of Columba, 132 13. S. 1 (1889), 28 Michigan Law Review 86.
This distinction, to our mind, is not a good one. One can of course
see how property held by the city might be injured by a nuisance, and
yet the public generally not be annoyed by the nuisance. But has not
the nuisance impaired the value of the property 9 And is not the im-
paired value of this property a loss to the public as a whole? But we
have found no authority for this view of the matter, and apparently
the view taken by Mr. Scarborough is the general one.
It would not be proper to close this note without giving some at-
tention to the unusual case of Freedman v. Borough of W Hazelton,
146 Atl. 564 (1929). In this case an Injunction was sought by the
plaintiff in his private capacity to restrain the defendant borough
from the further discharge of sewage onto the plaintiff's land. Thus
we witness the unique spectacle of the public defending the existance
of a public nuisance through their alleged prescriptive right to do so.
The lower court found, as a conclusion of law, that this condition con-
stituted a public nuisance. This finding was affirmed by the higher
court, which ruled that where a public nuisance works a private injury,
no prescriptive right can be urged against private action for such
injury.
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The writer of a note in the Michigan Law Review, 28 Mich. Law
Review 86, regards this as an extension of the general rule. He cites,
in support of his position, the case of Ireland & C. v. Bowman &
Cockrell, 130 Ky. 153, 113. S. W 56 (1908), wherein it was held that
"the person injured in the case of a public nuisance may lose his
right of action or right to complain of the nuisance in precisely the
same time that he may lose his right to complain of a private nuisance,
for the thing for which the action is brought is the wrong to his
rights." See, also, the case of Charnley v. Shawano Water-Power &
River Improvement Co., 109 Wis. 563, 86 N. W 507 (1901).
But that this is the general rule is questionable. In Joyce's Law
on Nuisances, Sec. 50, it is stated: "So, where the use of a stream
constitutes a public nuisance, no right by prescription to continue such
use can be acquired as against an individual who has sustained special
injury as a result of such use." Bowen v. Wendt, 103 Cal. 236, 37 Pac.
149 (1894). And in the case of Meiners v. Frederzck Miller Breunng
Co., 78 Wis. 364, 47 N. W 430 (1890), which was a private action to
abate a public nuisance, it wag held that the defense of prescription is
not available. The court in this case ruled that, "In the case of a public
nuisance, it never becomes in itself lawful. It is not unlawful as to
the whole public, and lawful as to its constituents. It is absolutely
and wholly unlawful."
That the court, on the facts of the case, really decided this point
in Freedman v. Borough of W Hazelton is, moreover, highly doubtful.
We quote the following: "Although the ditch has been openly used for
that purpose since 1902, that fact constitutes no defense to a proceed-
ing by an individual for the removal of an unlawful nuisance which
developed in later years from such use." Under the facts of the case,
in fine, the statutory period for prescription, even of a common
nuisance, had not run against the plaintiff.
It might, we think, safely be said that thus far precedent has not
bound the courts to decide either way in such cases. In most jurisdic-
tions the courts are thus left free to take that course which is to the
best interest of the public.
That there are good and sufficient reasons for guarding jealously
the doctrine of prescription scarcely need be mentioned here. As has
often been pointed out, public rights would otherwise be whittled
gradually away, for public officials cannot be trusted to exercise that
vigilance which the individual exercises in this respect; and individual
citizens "would be too slightly interested to make objections, preferring
rather to tolerate encroachments upon public property than to dispute
the right of their neighbors."
How many examples can you not call to mind to illustrate the
truth of this? It is only when some positive injury threatens that
citizens bestir themselves. And even in these instances they often-
times do so at the cost of running counter to an organized, often
prominent group of men, who exercise every means within their power
to convince the public that those who are attempting to serve the
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public are mere busybodies. And this usually small group often suc-
ceeds in making dupes of other men, equally prominent, but not
fully informed as to the matter in issue. The average citizen becomes
hopelessly confused. It is a fortunate thing, in such instances, that
prescription cannot be maintained against the public, and that these
citizens have at least a fighting chance of abating a nuisance, or of
repossessing themselves of public property.
BYo H. PUiMR Y.
CouiTY AND MUNIciPL IN E~mrNns&S.--In composing this note no
distinction between the indebtedness of a county and that of muni-
cipalities of the various classes will be attempted.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky held in a recent case, that a
municipality of the third class, without a vote of the people, may issue
bonds to fund a floating indebtedness, if legally incurred, which has
accumulated through a course of years, even though the aggregate
amount of the indebtedness is in excess of the amount of revenue
"provided" for the year in which the bonds are issued. Hall v. City of
Hopkznsville, et al., 46 S. W (2d) 497 (Ky. 1932).
The decision is based upon both constitutional and statutory pro-
visions, together with a long line of previous decisions, all of which
shall be discussed subsequently. Sections 157, 158 of the Kentucky
Constitution; Kentucky Statutes, 3284; Vaughn v. City of Corbzn, 217
Ky. 521, 289 S. W 1104; Wilson v. Cowngton, 220 Ky. 798, 295 S. W
1068; Baker, et al. v. Rockcastle County Court, 225 Ky. 99, 7 S. W (2d)
846.
Section 157 of the Kentucky Constitution was passed for the pur-
pose of curbing such gross indebtedness as was sure to come and the
language there used appears to be very clear and conclusive.
Section 157 provides as follows: "No county, city, town, taxing
district, or other municipality, shall be authorized or permitted to be-
come indebted, in any manner or for any purpose, to an amount ex-
ceeding, in any year, the income and revenue provided for such year,
without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof, voting at an
election to be held for that purpose; and any indebtedness contracted
In violation of this section shall be void. Nor shall such contract be
enforceable by the person with whom made; nor shall such muni-
cipality ever be authorized to assume the same."
Even though the language is distinct, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, by "seizing" upon two words in the provision, has almost
destroyed the entire meaning and effect of the section. The words
which have afforded them the loophole are: "provided," and "indebted-
ness." In City of Provmdence v. Providence Electrsc Light Company,
122 Ky. 237, 91 S. W. 664, Carrol, J., said as to the meaning of the
word "provided:" "it is the amount of tax that may be leved and
raised under the Constitution that must be looked to in determining
whether or not the indebtedness 'exceeds in any year the income and
